Second Circuit ADA Case a Game-Changer for Employee Accommodation Requests

Last week, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals announced a significant change to the standard by which employers must address disability-related accommodation requests.  In Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District, Case No. 23-665, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs suing their employers for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation no longer need to prove that the accommodation was necessary to perform the employee’s essential job duties.  This begs the question: if an accommodation is not necessary, how can employers determine whether an employee is entitled to one? 

Let’s dive into the facts: Angel Tudor, a high school math teacher, had a decades-long history of PTSD related to sexual assault and trauma that she experienced at her former workplace. Symptoms were severe and disruptive to her daily functioning and included a stutter that impeded her communication and nightmares that would disrupt her sleep and cause vomiting. She took several medications to manage her symptoms and had been admitted to a hospital for psychiatric care on three occasions.  Under a prior administration of the Whitehall Central School District (the defendant), Ms. Tudor was permitted to leave campus to take one 15-minute break during each of her morning and afternoon “prep periods” in order to help manage her symptoms. When a new administration took over, however, it instituted a policy prohibiting teachers from leaving campus during prep periods. When Ms. Tudor attempted to leave campus during prep periods in accordance with her prior accommodation, she was reprimanded and told that the documentation on file was insufficient to establish her right to an accommodation. Ms. Tudor sued for failure to accommodate. Significantly, Ms. Tudor admitted that, notwithstanding her disability-related pain, she was able to perform the essential functions of her job regardless of the alleged denial of her accommodation, though “under great duress and harm.” 

Based on this admission, the District Court granted summary judgment to the school district. 

The Second Circuit reversed, however, concluding that the District Court “erred by holding that an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of her job without a reasonable accommodation is fatal to her failure-to-accommodate claim.” The Court took a strict textual reading of the ADA, noting that the ADA defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  The Second Circuit reasoned that “[a] straightforward reading of the ADA confirms that an employee may qualify for a reasonable accommodation even if she can perform the essential functions of her job without the accommodation.” (emphasis added).  The Court further noted that while “[a]bility to perform the essential functions of the job is relevant to a failure-to-accommodate claim, [] it is not dispositive.” Therefore, “an employer must, absent undue hardship, offer a reasonable accommodation–such as a modified work schedule–to an employee with a disability if that employee is capable of performing the essential functions of her job with or without the accommodation.” 

The Court’s holding that need is not a requirement for a reasonable accommodation is in line with other Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue, including the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. However, the decision does not address whether an employee must establish any sort of need or difficulty in performing essential job functions to qualify for a reasonable accommodation, or whether the “reasonable” nature of the accommodation request is the only relevant inquiry. As a practical matter, the level of need often guides whether a particular accommodation is reasonable under the circumstances.  This is particularly true in the context of mental health and stress-related accommodation requests, in which necessity is less obvious than with physical disabilities.  Mental-health related disability accommodation requests have risen sharply since the start of the pandemic and have a ripple effect on the entire workforce.  While the facts in Tudor supported the severity of mental health symptoms, the significant benefits of the accommodation, and the relatively minor burden on the school, the new standard announced by the Second Circuit creates uncertainty for employers and may open the door for a wave of lawsuits on less meritorious grounds.  Will employers need to accommodate every “reasonable” request for breaks or remote work that might be mildly helpful to an employee? Will a specific standard of justification to a requested accommodation emerge? What role will necessity play going forward? Where will courts strike the balance between benefit to the employee and burden on the employer?  

One thing is clear: employers in the Second Circuit can no longer deny an accommodation request solely based on the fact that an employee is able to perform essential job duties without it.  Rather, employers will need to balance the level of difficulty an employee experiences in performing essential job duties, whether the accommodation at issue will ease the burden on the employee, and whether the accommodation would create an undue hardship on the employer.  The Tudor decision suggests that the reasonable nature of the accommodation is the most important factor in the decision, and that absent a showing that the accommodation at issue presents an undue hardship, it will be difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment on failure to accommodate claims.